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ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes the impacts of income-sharing on the incentives
to work and on the supply of labor in a labor-managed firm. Monitoring is
explicitly incorporated in the measurement of labor input. The incentive
structure in a labor-managed firm is distorted. Perfect monitoring is not
Pareto-efficien t. However, an income-sharing scheme does not change the
argument that the incentives to work are positively correlated with the
degree of accuracy in monitoring effort. The supply of effort in a labor
managed firm also depends on peer pressure which is a substitute for
monitoring. The existence of peer pressure reduces the distortion in
incentive structure and thus improves the efficiency of time allocation.
In addition, the supervisibility of effort in the production process
imposes a constraint on the optimum, size .of a labor-managed firm.

I. INTRODUCTION
The impacts of income-sharing characteristic on the incentives to
work and the supply of labor in a labor-managed firm (LMF) 1 raise many
theoretical disputes. On the one hand, Ward (1958), Domar (1966), Vanek

(1969, 1970), Meade (1972), and others argue that a worker in a LMF has
higher incentives to work than a wage worker in a conventional firm
because he gets some direct benefits from the additional profits from his
extra effort. Furthermore, Sen (1966), Israelsen (1980), Putterman

(1980), and so forth argue that, if the income is distributed according
to work, workers in a LMF tend to over-work instead of shirking. On the
other hand, Jensen and Meckling (1979), and Williamson (1980), among
other economists, argue that a LMF is subject to free-rider abuses
because of its income-sharing nature; therefore, the incentives to work
shall be low in a LMF. The empirical observations do not unequivocally
support either view. Some authors find that the income-sharing has
positive effects on the incentives to work in a LMF (e. g., Bradley and
Gelb 1980; and Jones and Svejnar 1985). Others attribute the failure of
some LMFs to the low incentives (e.g., Bradley and Clark 1972, Perkins
and Yusuf 1984, chap. 5).
The income-sharing scheme itself does not necessarily invite over
working or free-rider abuses. Central to this controversy is how costly
it is to monitor effort in a LMF (Alchian and Demsetz 1972). The pros
implicitly assume that effort can be perfectly monitored without any
1

2

cost.

Their opponents, conversely, imply that it is too costly to

monitor in a LMF. In this paper I try to show that the incentives to work
in a LMF depend on the nature of the production process, namely, how
costly it is to monitor each worker's effort in production. The income
sharing characteristic of a LMF distorts the structure of incentives in a
LMF. However, it does not change the fact that the incentives to work are
positively correlated with the degree of accuracy of vertical supervision
or monitoring exerted by the management. As in any other form of firm, a
higher degree of accuracy of monitoring requires higher costs to perform.
The management of a LMF thus has to balance the benefit of higher
incentives and the additional costs arising from a higher degree of
monitoring. Therefore, the optimum degree of monitoring in a LMF depends
on how costly the monitoring of effort is in the production process,
which is determined by the nature of production. If monitoring is easy,
the incentives to work shall be high in a LMF, ceteris paribus. On the
other hand, the free-rider abuse shall be severe if monitoring is
difficult. But because the income-sharing characteristic alters the
structure of incentives in a LMF, from the welfare point of view perfect
monitoring is Pareto-ineffic ient.
The income-sharing characteristic in a LMF also affects effort
supply from the other way. In a LMF, the income of each worker depends
not only on his own effort but also on the effort of other workers.
Therefore, there exists a horizontal supervision or peer pressure as
defined by Chinn (1979). This paper throws additional light on the
interactions between vertical and horizontal supervision. It is found
that horizontal supervision is a substitute for vertical supervision. An
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increase in the degree of monitoring by the management in a LMF induces a
decrease of peer pressure between member workers. The existence of peer
pressure reduces the distortion in incentive structure and thus improves
the efficiency of time allocation.
The choice of optimum size of a LMF with considerations of
monitoring costs is also discussed in this paper. Monitoring costs
increase with the size of a LMF. Therefore, for an increasing size to be
desirable, the gain in productivity should be able to compensate for the
additional costs. Because of the income-sharing characteristic, the
optimum size of a LMF is smaller than that of a conventional firm,
ceteris paribus. Furthermore, the supervisibility of effort is found to
be a constraint on the choice of size.
This paper is organized as follows. In section II, several key
concepts are defined, and basic assumptions of this paper are presented.
Section III analyzes the economic meanings of the incentives to work and
of peer pressure and studies the effects of a change in monitoring on the
incentives and peer pressure in a partial context. Section IV discusses
the optimum choices of effort contribution by individual workers and of
degree of monitoring by the management in an equilibrium framework. In
Sections III and IV, the number of workers in a LMF is assumed to be
exogenously given. Section V treats the number of workers in a LMF as an
endogenous variable and turns attentions to the choice of optimum size of
a LMF. Finally, some concluding remarks are presented in Section VI.

II. EFFORT, MONITORING, PEER PRESSURE, AND WORK POINTS
This section describes the basic model of a LMF in which income is
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distributed according to work. The novelty of this model is its formal
inclusion of monitoring as an argument in the determination of work
points.
To simplify the matter, a LMF is assumed to have N identical
workers, which will be taken as given in Sections III and IV.
worker has the same ability and preference. 2

Every

It is assumed that the

utility index, Ui, of worker i depends on his income, Yi, effort, ei, and
the absolute value of peer pressure, IPil. A worker is assumed to choose
his effort contribution to maximize his utility. More concretely, it is
assumed that:

(1)

Ui(.) is assumed to be twice differentiable and concave in all its
arguments. 0

=,;;

ei

=,;;

1.

Zero means that no effort is supplied.

One

stands for fully effective work. 3 Income is distributed from the ·LMF
according to the ith worker's work point share, si, and the net income,
Y, of the firm, that is,

(2)

Yi
The work point share is a ratio between the work points accumulated by
the ith worker, hi, and the total work points in the LMF, H.

(3)

The work point represents the ith worker's effort contribution that is
perceived and credited by the management. 4

It is, therefore, a function

of his effort supply, ei, and the degree of monitoring exerted by the
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management in the I.MF, n.

(4)
n is defined as the degree of accuracy in metering workers' effort

contributions.

It

is

also

monitoring is perfect, n = 1.

a

variable

ranging from zero to one. When

In this case, hi= h(l, ei)

monitoring does not exist, n = 0. Under this condition, hi
for all i, where 0 <as l; that is, if workers are not monitored, they
are assumed to have worked equally intensively. 5

The work point function

also has the following properties:

8hi

~

equality holds when n

0,

aei
8hi
- - - s 0,

equality holds when ei

an

a 2h-1

> 0

O·

'

l·

(5)

'

6

anaei

As each worker is assumed to be identical, it is important to
mention here that in equilibrium each worker will offer the same amount
of effort and, as a consequence, hi= h, si = 1/N for every worker.
The peer pressure on the ith worker is denoted as Pi·

In a I.MF, the

income of each worker depends not only on his own effort but also on the
effort of the other workers.

If all the other workers can benefit from

the additional effort contributed by an individual worker, there will be
pressure on him from the other workers to contribute more effort. In this
case, Pi is assumed to be positive. Conversely, if all the other workers
benefit from the reduced effort by an individual worker, there will be
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pressure on him from the other members to reduce his effort supply. In
this situation, Pi is assumed to be negative. An operational definition
of peer pressure will not be given until Section III, where we discuss
the interactions between monitoring and peer pressure. The reasons that
peer pressure is positive in the former case and negative in the latter
case become obvious in that definition. However, we assume here that
positive peer pressure and negative peer pressure have a symmetrical
disutility effect on each worker's preference.

Thus, what enters the

utility function is the absolute value of peer pressure.

It is shown in

Section IV that when peer pressure is positive, an individual worker will
increase his effort supply and he will reduce it when peer pressure is
negative. 7
To concentrate on incentive aspects of a LMF, the simplest
technology for a firm is adopted. Production requires only the total
effort that is contributed by the members. So,

X

F(E)

with FE> 0

(6)

Xis output, Eis the total effort offered by the N individual
workers, and

Fis the production function. Eis a function of the degree

of monitoring.
(7)

The rationale for this assumption will be discussed later.
The net income for the LMF is

(8)

with Ci> 0, Cii > 0.

i

~. N,

r,

7
where C, the costs of monitoring, is a function of the degree of
monitoring, ~, the size of the membership of the LMF, N, and the degree
of difficulty in monitoring labor effort,

r.

r

is itself a function of a

vector of exogenous variables, such as sequential and spatial dimensions
of the production process that affect the supervisibility of labor
effort.

An increased value of

r

implies that the difficulty of

monitoring effort is raised. In addition to all the usual assumptions of
a cost function with respect to its first and second derivatives, the
monitoring cost function has the following properties:

CC0; N, I')

0,

(9a)

cc~;

1, r)

0,

(9b)

CC~; N, 0)

0.

(9c)

Equation C9a) stipulates that monitoring costs are zero when no
monitoring activities are engaged in.

Equation C9b) says that monitoring

costs are zero when a person works for himself.

Since he knows exactly

how he works, there is no need to divert any resources for the purpose of
metering his own effort.

Equation C9c) postulates that monitoring costs

are zero when labor effort is transparent and thus can be metered
perfectly at no cost.
The management of a LMF is assumed to have perfect knowledge of the
monitoring cost function, C(~; N, I'); the production function, FCE); and
the effort supply function, EC~).

Following the tradition of Ward,

Domar, and Vanek, the objective of the management is assumed to be that
of maximizing the average net income per worker. 8
objective function is

To be precise, the

8

max
n

1

{F[E(n)] - C(n; N, r)}.

(10)

N
III. MONITORING, INCENTIVES, AND PEER PRESSURR

Economically, as in any other form of firm, a worker's incentives to
work are the marginal income accrued to him for his contribution of an
additional unit of effort. Nevertheless, due to the income-sharing
characteristic, the return to an additional unit of effort has two
components in a LMF. First, he will get a share of the increase in total
output. Second, his share of total income becomes larger as now his
contribution of effort in total effort increases. Whether the incentives
are distorted upward or downward, however, depends on the degree of
monitoring. Taking other workers' effort supplies and monitoring as
given, we find from the partial derivative of expression (2) that the
incentives to work for worker i can be expressed as

Si FE + (1 - Si ) · Ai ·

( F - C ),

(11)

E

where Ai
The first term on the RHS is the gain from the increase in the production
of the LMF, and the second term is the gain from the increase in the work
point share. Notice that Ai has

the following properties: when n = 0, Ai

= O; when n = 1, Ai= 1. Also notice that because each worker is assumed
to be identical, in equilibrium si in expression (11) can be substituted
for by 1/N.
The confusion over the incentive structure in a LMF can be easily
understood in the context of expression (11). When monitoring is perfect
and costless, which is implicitly assumed by Sen (1966), Israelsen
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(1980), and most theoretical models of LMF, expression (11) in
equilibrium is reduced to

1/N. FE+ (1 - 1/N) F.

(lla)

E

The RHS of expression (lla) is a simple weighted average between the
marginal product and the average product of effort. As the normal
production range is located at where the average product is greater than
the marginal product, Sen and others thus conclude that the incentives to
work in a LMF are distorted upward from the optimum incentives, FE.
Perfect monitoring makes a worker over-work to compete for a larger share
of the existing income. Therefore, perfect monitoring is Pareto
inefficient in a LMF. If monitoring does not exist, expression (11)
becomes
(llb)

In this case, a worker only gets 1/N of the marginal product of his
effort, so the incentives are distorted downward which is what has been
implicitly assumed by some authors on Soviet and China's collective farms
(Bradley and Clark 1972; Perkins and Yusuf, 1984, p.79).
The above discussions are summarized as following:
PROPOSITION 1: Whether the incentives to work in a LMF are distorted
upward or downward from the optimum incentives depends on the
degree of monitoring. In the normal production range (average
product falling), perfect monitoring results in an over
contribution of effort in a LMF; therefore, perfect monitoring is

10
Pareto-inefficient.

A. Monitoring and Incentives
Raising the degree of monitoring will be accompanied by an increase
in the costs of monitoring. 9 Before we study the combined effects,
however, it is instructive to look at the separate effects that the
degree of monitoring and the costs of monitoring have on the incentives
to work in a I.MF. Intuitively, an increase in the degree of monitoring
itself shall improve the incentives, as reward is related more closely to
effort; meanwhile, an increase in the costs of monitoring shall dilute
the incentives as each share of income becomes smaller. These intuitions
are confirmed in our model.
From expression (11) and applying·the assumption that each worker is
identical, we can see that an increase in the degree of monitoring
affects a worker's incentives to work only through the change in Ai, the
average net product's adjusting factor. Mathematically, this partial
derivative is

(1 - 1/N) . ( F -C) . 8Ai
E

(12)

Given each worker's effort contribution and the costs of monitoring,
8Ai/8n > 0. Consequently, expression (12) is positive; that is, the
increase in the degree of monitoring itself improves the incentives to
work in a I.MF.
The effect of monitoring costs on the incentives can be analyzed in
the same way. Taking the partial derivative of expression (11) with
respect to C and applying the assumption that workers are identical, we
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get

(13)

Expression (13) is negative. Therefore, a rise in the monitoring costs
itself lowers the incentives to work in a LMF.
PROPOSITION 2. In a LMF, an increase in the degree of monitoring itself
improves the incentives to work and the accompanying rise of the
costs of monitoring deteriorates the incentives to work; however, in
the management's choice range of monitoring, the total effect on
incentives of an increase in the degree of monitoring shall be
positive.
The second part of this proposition holds because the objective of
the management is to maximize the net output per worker. In choosing a
degree of monitoring, the LMF management thus needs to consider these two
opposite effects simultaneously. If the total effect on the incentives is
negative, then the costs of monitoring can be reduced, and the output of
the LMF can be increased by the decrease in the degree of monitoring.
Such a point will necessarily be excluded from its choice set.
B.

Monitoring and Peer Pressure
Due to the income-sharing characteristic in a LMF, a worker's income

depends not only on his own effort but also on the other members'
efforts.

Taking the LMF as a whole, any increase in effort by any member

is definitely desirable.
consequence.

The total and net outputs increase in

Nonetheless, whether all the other workers encourage an

individual worker to take such an action depends on how all the others'
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incomes are affected.

Chinn (1979) defines peer pressure as the

incremental income gains that are accrued to all other members in a LMF
and are derived from the increase in effort by an individual worker. 10
Although Chinn has studied the effects of different distribution schemes
and different degrees of team cohesion on peer pressure, I would like to
examine the sensitivity of peer pressure to changes in the degree of
monitoring.
Mathematically, peer pressure on the ith worker, Pi, can be
expressed as

Pi

(1 - 1/N)FE - (1 - 1/N) . Ai . ( F-C).

(14a)

E

Here the assumption that workers are identical is applied. The first term
on the RHS is the incremental income contributed to all the other members
in the LMF by the increase in output induced,by the ith worker's
additional effort. The second term, which we have noticed in expression
(11), is the incremental income that is accrued to the ith worker due to
his increased share of work points.

Hence, if what he contributes to the

other members by his increased effort is larger than what he takes away
by his added work point share, the other members will encourage him to
increase effort. Otherwise, they will discourage him to increase effort.
By examining expression (14a), we see that when the marginal product of
effort, FE, is greater than the adjusted average net product, Ai . [(F C)/E], peer pressure is positive; peer pressure is negative when the
opposite holds; and it is zero when the marginal product of effort equals
the adjusted average net product of effort.

Thus, peer pressure on a

worker depends on which region of effort supply is relevant to him.
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However, if monitoring does not exist, expression (14a) becomes

Pi

(14b)

It is definitely positive. Everyone is better-off by pressing each other
to work harder.
Expression (14a) can also be rearranged as,

Pi

(14c)

The first term on the RHS is the incremental income gain to the LMF as a
whole by the ith worker's extra effort. The second term is the ith
worker's incentives to work.
Knowing the meaning of peer pressure, we will now show that, in a
LMF, peer pressure is a substitute for monitoring in terms of their
effects on the supply of effort. From the partial derivative of
expression (14c) with respect to~,

(15)

The RHS of expression (15) is the negative of expression (12). Because
expression (12) is a positive function of~. an increase in~ reduces
peer pressure.
Similarly, the effect of an increase in the costs of monitoring on
peer pressure is just the opposite of expression (13). This can be seen
from the partial derivatives of expression (14c) with respect to
monitoring costs.

14
(16)

From expressions (15) and (16), we conclude that the influences of
monitoring terms--the degree of monitoring and the costs of monitoring-
on the incentives and on peer pressure are opposite. The total effect of
an increase in the degree of monitoring on the incentives should be
positive in the relevant region of the management's decision making
(recalling Proposition 2); hence, the total effect on peer pressure
should be negative in the relevant region. Both monitoring and peer
pressure affect the supply of effort in a LMF (see discussions in the
next section); therefore,
PROPOSITION 3: Peer pressure is a substitute for monitoring in the
relevant region, in terms of its impacts on the supply of effort.
When monitoring increases (decreases), peer pressure decreases
(increases) relatively.
IV. MONITORING, EFFORT SUPPLY, AND SUPERVISIBILITY
In this section we seek to prove the central proposition of this
paper, namely, that the incentives to work in a LMF depend on the
supervisibility of effort in its production process. In other words, we
will demonstrate that if it is easy to monitor each worker's effort, the
incentives to work will be high; the opposite holds if effort is
difficult to meter, ceteris paribus. The method proceeds in two steps.
First, the choices of optimum effort supply by each worker and optimum
degree of monitoring by the management are analyzed, given the
supervisibility of effort in the production process. When a worker
chooses his effort supply, he considers his own rate of substitution
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between income and leisure, his incentives to work, and peer pressure. As
the incentive structure is distorted in a LMF, the existence of peer
pressure is shown to improve the efficiency of time allocation. The
management's choice of optimum degree of monitoring has to balance the
incentive effect and the cost effect. In the second step, comparative
statics are applied to demonstrate the central proposition.
A.

Choice and Equilibrium
To analyze how the management chooses the optimum degree of

monitoring and how individual workers choose their effort supplies, we
need to proceed in an equilibrium framework because monitoring and effort
supplies are simultaneously determined.
Each worker in a LMF is assumed to choose his own effort supply to
maximize his utility. From expression (1), with the degree of monitoring,
the cost of monitoring, and all the other workers' effort supplies given,
the necessary condition for worker i's utility maximization is
ui
ei
ui
Yi

ayi

+
aei

ui
Pi
ui
Yi
for i = 1, 2,

8pi
sgn(pi)

(17)

aei

.'

N.

ui is the ith worker's marginal disutility of work; -ui can then
ei
ei
be interpreted as the marginal utility of leisure. Therefore, the LHS is
the marginal rate of substitution between income and leisure. Welfare
optimality requires that this rate be equal to FE, the marginal product
of effort. The first term on the RHS is the marginal income of effort or
the incentives to work, which may be distorted upward or downward from
FE. The second term on the RHS is an adjustment for the existence of peer
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pressure. It assumes the same sign as peer pressure. Recalling expression
(14a), the sign of peer pressure on the ith worker is positive when his
effort supply is located in the region where FE - Ai . [(F-E)/E] < 0. By
expression (11), his incentives to work are distorted downward in this
region. Therefore, the existence of positive peer pressure increases the
incentives to work and thus alleviates the distortion. On the other hand,
when his effort supply is located in the region where

FE - Ai . [(F

E)/E] > 0, his incentives to work are distorted upward; however, peer
pressure assumes a negative value (see expression 14a) in this case and
thus the existence of peer pressure reduces his incentives to work. Peer
pressure once again reduces the distortion. Peer pressure is zero if his
effort supply is located at the point where FE - Ai . [(F-E)/E] = 0. At
this point his incentives to work as well as time allocation are optimum.
Therefore,
PROPOSITION 4: The existence of peer pressure in a LMF reduces the
distortion of incentive structure and thus improves the efficiency
of time allocation between work and leisure.
If the utility gain for worker i from the improvement in time
allocation outweighs the disutility of peer pressure, the existence of
peer pressure is a Pareto-improvement because, by definition, all the
other workers also gain from the peer pressure on the ith worker.
The determination of the degree of monitoring is modeled by
permitting the management to decide how much monitoring is optimum for
maximizing the average net income per worker, with workers making
marginal adjustments in their decisions about how much effort to
contribute.

The relationships between the management and the workers are
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supposed to be of Stackelberg type.

The management takes the reaction

functions of the individual workers as given, while individual workers
take the actions of the management as given.

For the determination of

the optimum degree of monitoring, therefore, it is essential to know the
properties of workers' effort supply functions.
The relationships among the workers are assumed to be of Cournot
Each worker takes all the other workers' efforts as given. As

Nash type.

there are N workers in the LMF, we will have N first-order conditions
from each worker's utility maximization.

The N first-order conditions

may be solved to provide N effort supply functions:

ei

ei(n, e1, ... ' ei-1• ei+l• ... , eN)

(18)

for i = 1, 2, ... , N.
Then, for a given n, assuming the Nash equilibrium is unique,
for all i (as workers are identical).

ef = e(n)

Thus the .effort supply function

for the LMF as a whole is

(19)

E

The task now is to show that E(n) is an increasing function of n in the
relevant region of management's choice. Proposition 2 posits that the
total effect on incentives of an increase in the degree of monitoring
should be positive in the relevant region of management's choice.

The

incentives, being the marginal income of effort, can be treated as the
shadow price of leisure.

When the price of leisure increases, each

worker will substitute leisure for work. Meanwhile, the simultaneous
increase in the costs of monitoring reduces each worker's net income.
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Therefore, the income effect on the effort supply is also positive.
Because both the substitution effect and the income effect are positive
in the relevant region, the effort supply for the LMF as a whole
increases as a result of an increase in the degree of monitoring.
Although the increase in monitoring will simultaneously be accompanied by
a decrease in peer pressure, which has a negative effect on the effort
supply, the monitoring effect will necessarily dominate the peer pressure
effect in the management's choice set. 11 Thus,
PROPOSITION 5: Within the management's choice set of monitoring, the
supply of total effort is a positive function of monitoring.
From expression (10), assuming an interior solution exists, the
first-order condition for the maximization of a LMF 's objective is

0

(20)

The first term on the LHS is the increase in output arising from the
increase in effort supply which can be called the incentive effect. The
second term is the increase in costs of monitoring which will be called
the cost effect.
PROPOSITION 6: If an interior solution exists, the management's

choice

of optimum degree of monitoring will equate, at the margin, the
incentive effect to the cost effect.

B.

Supervisibility, Degree of Monitoring, and Incentives
So far we have demonstrated that the income-sharing characteristic

in a LMF can distort the incentive structure upward or downward depending
on the degree of monitoring exercised by the management. However, in
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choosing the optimum degree of monitoring, the management has to consider
both the incentive effect and the cost effect. How costly an additional
degree of monitoring is depends on how difficult it is to monitor effort
in the production process. Therefore, the incentives to work, high or
low, actually hinge on the supervisibility of effort in the production
process. Although supervisibility of effort is exogenous to a LMF, at
least in the short run and without changing the sizes of a LMF, different
LMFs may have different degrees of difficulty in monitoring effort. The
difference in supervisibility may explain why the performances of

LMFs

are so diverse. To investigate how supervisibility affects the incentives
to work in a LMF, we first see how it affects the management's choice of
optimum degree of monitoring.

Differentiating expression (20) totally

with respect ton and rand solving for dn/dr gives
dn

(21)

dr
The denominator of expression (21) is just the second-order condition of
management's maximization problem.

It is negative by assumption.

The

numerator is positive because, as the difficulty of monitoring, r,
increases, it becomes harder to monitor effort.

Thus, the marginal cost

of an additional degree of monitoring increases as a result.

The sign of

expression (21) is thus negative. The next two propositions follow
immediately from expression (21).
PROPOSITION 7: If there are two LMFs identical in every aspect except in
the supervisibility of effort in their production processes, the
management in the LMF with higher supervisibility chooses a higher
degree of monitoring than the management in the LMF with lower
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supervisibility .
PROPOSITION 8: If there are two LMFs identical in every aspect except in
the supervisibility of effort in their production processes, workers
in the LMF with

higher supervisibility have higher incentives to

work than workers in the lower

supervisibility LMF.

Proposition 8 holds because, as stated in Proposition 2, the
incentives to work are positively correlated with the degree of
monitoring.
V. SUPERVISION AND THE OPTIMUM SIZE OF A LMF
This section investigates the effect of the income-sharing
characteristic on the optimum size of a LMF. This issue is especially
relevant in socialist countries. Most collective farms (one specific form
of LMF) in socialist economies are large with low productivity.

As

Schultz (1964, p. 113) points out, such gigantic farms are established
out of certain political motivations backed by particular beliefs about
"returns to scale."

As the costs of monitoring increase with the size,

the low incentives to work in collective farms may arise from the fact
that they are too large.

However, some analytical models, overlooking

monitoring problems, suggest that the incentives to work increase with
size (see Israelsen 1980).

In the last two sections, we have avoided the

problem of size by assuming that a LMF is bestowed with fixed members.
In this section, that assumption is relaxed, and the problems of size and
other related issues are addressed.

A.

the Choice of Optimum Size
Intuitively, two factors need to be considered in the choice of
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size. First, there must be some productivity gain related to larger size.
Second, the costs of monitoring increase as the size becomes larger. In a
conventional firm the optimum choice of size is at the point where the
increase in productivity just compensates for the rise in monitoring
costs. However, the optimum choice of size will be smaller for a LMF
because of its income-sharing characteristic. To illustrate this choice
of size, let us assume that the management is bestowed with the authority
to recruit new members if the size of the LMF is too small or not to
replace the retired members if the size is too large. 12 We also assume,
following the convention of Ward (1958), that every worker supplies a
fixed amount of effort. 13
max

y

N

The problem for the management is

~[F(N; e) - C(N; ~, r)]

(22)

N

subject to

N

~

1.

Assuming that an interior solution exists, the first-order condition
for maximization is

F - C

(23)

N

The optimum size for a conventional firm locates at the point where FN CN =0. This verifies the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 9: Due to the income-sharing characteristic, the optimum
size of a LMF is smaller than a conventional firm, ceteris
paribus . 14
From expression (23), we see that if an interior solution exists,
the optimum size of a LMF is determined at the point where the net
marginal product of size equals the net average product of size. Other
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things equal, if the returns to size are larger, the optimum size of a
LMF will be larger.ls

B.

Supervisibility and the Optimum Size
A moment's reflection on expression (23) suggests that the optimum

size of a LMF should be smaller if it is more difficult to monitor effort
in its production process. However, due to the income-sharing
characteristic, this intuition holds only with some additional
assumptions on the cost function. Ignoring the possibility of a binding
constraint, differentiating equation (23) totally with respect to N and

r

and rearranging yields
N + Cr

dN

-CNr

dr

(CNN - FNN)N

The sign of the denominator is positive.
sign as the numerator.

(24)

So dN/dr has the same

However, the sign of the numerator seems to be

indeterminate.

iff

< 1
>

(25)

This bewildering situation arises from the fact that two things happen at
the same time when the difficulty of monitoring increases. First, the
monitoring costs are something like a tax on a LMF. As Ward (1958) has
demonstrated, in a LMF, when the tax increases, it is beneficial for the
existing members of the LMF to recruit more workers in order to reduce
the burden of tax on each member. Thus, the size of the LMF should
increase. Second, as the marginal cost of monitoring increases, the net
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marginal product of size decreases; therefore, the size of the I.MF should
be reduced. The final result depends on which force dominates.
Fortunately, expression (25) depends on the relative magnitudes of CNr
and Cr.

Therefore, the key to the answer is the structure of monitoring

cost function. One possible functional form that meets all the
requirements of equations (8) and (9a)-(9c) is a general Cobb-Douglas
function:

C(1r, N, r)

where

(26)

a,~. and~ need not be constant.

However, in the relevant region,

a and~ are required to be greater than 1 in order to meet the condition

If this general Cobb-Douglas function form is assumed,
~
---- > 1 .

N

Cr

(27)

N - 1

Consequently, the sign of dN/dr is negative.

To the extent that

any function can be locally approximated by a general Cobb-Douglas
function, this result should also hold, in the relevant region, for any
cost function with the properties stipulated by equations (8) and (9a),
(9b), (9c). We thus conclude,
PROPOSITION 10: The optimum size of a I.MF is negatively

correlated

with the difficulty of monitoring in its production process, ceteris
paribus.
If the effort in the production process is easy to monitor, the
optimum size of a I.MF will be large; if monitoring is difficult to
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implement, the optimum size will be small, other things equal.
VI. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I have studied the impacts of the vertical and
horizontal supervision in a LMF on the incentives to work, the supply of
labor, and the optimum size of a LMF. I hope this paper has shed some
light on the crucial issue of supervision in a LMF, which has long been
neglected in the formal models of a LMF.
Monitoring and peer pressure are only two of many factors that
affect the incentives, labor supply, as well as the optimum size of a
LMF.

Other factors, such as the proportion between distribution

according to need and distribution according to work, relative price of
output, fixed charges on a LMF, and so on, also have important impacts on
these issues. 16

However, supervision may very well be one of the most

important factors in the determination of individual incentives and thus
the success or failure of a LMF. Successful examples of LMFs are often
found in the manufacturing or processing sectors (see Jones and Svejnar
1982, 1985; Stephen 1982); however, the performances of LMFs in
agricultural production are often dismal (See Bradley and Clark 1972;
Johnson and Brooks 1983; Perkins and Clark 1984; and Carter 1984). I
think that one of the main reasons is differences in the supervisibility
of labor in production processes.

Manufacturing and processing are

highly specialized, are concentrated in small areas, and have
standardized routines. It is much easier for the manager to monitor the
workers' performances and to relate the rewards to their efforts.
Therefore, the incentives to shirk are smaller in these sectors.

In

agriculture, however, production is widely dispersed and involves long
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periods of production and diversified jobs.

It is very costly to provide

close monitoring in agriculture. Because of the high costs of monitoring,
the optimum degree of monitoring in an agricultural cooperative must be
low; the monetary differences between a job done poorly and one done
competently are thus little (Johnson and Brooks 1983, p. 179).
Therefore, the incentives to work as well as the productivity are both
very low. 17
The efficient mode of organization is the one which economizes on
transaction costs (Williamson 1980). The costs of monitoring are a major
component of transaction costs. Because of its income-sharing
characteristic and the existence of peer pressure, a LMF can be a
superior way to provide the incentives to work if (a) the returns to size
are fairly large and at the same time it is too costly to provide any
meaningful monitoring, or (b)

monitoring is not very costly. If the

returns to size are limited and the costs of monitoring are high, a LMF
is not an efficient mode of organization. Agriculture belongs to the last
category. The efficiency of American farms, compared with those of the
Soviet Union, should be attributed to the fact that most farms in the
United States are owner-operated farms, which have little problems of
properly monitoring, metering, and rewarding labor effort. 18
Nevertheless, most socialist countries, including China in the past,
established gigantic collective farms and thus exacerbate the
difficulties of monitoring. China has made a series of major reforms
since 1978. A new institution called "the household responsibility
system" has replaced the production teams with the individual household
as the unit of production.

The difficulty of monitoring in the
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production team system is identified empirically as the main reason for
this institutional change (Lin 1987a) and the incentives to work are
found to have been improved greatly after this institutional reform (Lin
1987b).
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participants at the University of Chicago and the Chinese University of
Hongkong. All responsibility for the remaining errors are only mine. The
financial support of the Prince Charitable Trusts and the Rockefeller
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1 The term "labor-managed firm" (LMF) is used in this paper to
designate entities that are called "worker-managed firm", "self-managed
firm", "producers' cooperative", "collective farm", or "production team"
in the economic literature.
2 For the case of heterogeneous workers, see an early, detailed
version of this paper (Lin 1985). All the propositions in this paper are
not altered, except wording, by the introduction of heterogeneity of
preferences. However, the analyses become very complicate because workers
need to be classified into three categories, namely, income-preferring,
leisure-preferring, and average workers.
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3The same specification is adopted in Calvo and Wellisz (1978).
4 The management in a LMF refers to the managers who are hired by the
workers' council in a competitive market to perform the monitoring
function. The management monitors workers' effort instead of their
marginal product because the principle of income distribution is "to each
according to his work."
5h(.) is assumed to be a nonstochastic function in this paper. At
first glance, it might appear to be preferable to make it stochastic.
However, si would become a ratio of two random variables. The
expectations of si as well as Yi might fail to exist. Consequently, the
problem became unsolvable without making other more strained assumptions
(see Putterman 1985). h(.) may be interpreted as a "certainty
equivalence" of a stochastic work point function.
6one of the possible .functional forms which have all the required
properties is:

7 Peer pressure on a worker is assumed to incur no cost on the other
workers in the LMF. This is admittedly a somewhat strained assumption. I
make it for two reasons. First, Binswanger and Rosenzweig (1986) have
argued that supervision as a by-product of the production process has the
lowest cost. Peer pressure is a by-product of the production process;
therefore, this assumption may not be too unrealistic. Nevertheless, it
greatly simplifies the expositions. Second, it can be verified that the
propositions in this paper can be extended in a straight-forward fashion,
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with some minor changes in the wording, to the case that cost of peer
pressure is included.
8When the members of a I.MF are fixed, it makes no difference in
maximizing average net income or

total net income.

objective of the management to maximize both

net

We can also make the
average

income

and

other elements of individual satisfaction instead of average net income
alone. However, this would yield a structure that is identical for
analytical purposes, but at the cost of much added complexity.
9The workers' council either has to hire more managers or a more
competent manager with higher salary to perform it.
10 To be precise, the incremental income gain is the incentives for
the other members to put peer pressure on the ith worker.

Here the

implicit assumption is that peer pressure is a linear transformation of
the incentives for applying peer pressure with the slope equal to unity
and starting from the origin.

I owe this point to Charles Kahn.

11 rf, at the management's choice set of monitoring, this claim does
not hold, then effort supply can be increased and cost of supervision can
be reduced by the decrease in the degree of monitoring. As management's
objective is maximizing the average net output, such a point will be
excluded from the management's choice set.
12 The asymmetry between hiring and dismissing workers in a I.MF
arises from the fact that the management in reality has difficulty to
decide who should be dismissed even if income for those that remain could
be increased by dismissing some, as Robinson (1967) pertinently argued in
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her comments on Ward's and Domar's papers. However, the size of a LMF can
be reduced by not replacing retired members although it may take longer
period of time to reach the optimum level.
13 This is a typical assumption made in the literature dealing with
the size of a LMF (see Ward 1958, Maurice and Ferguson 1972, Miyazaki and
Neary 1983). The problem becomes intractable if effort is a choice
variable. Also, for the simplicity of exposition, the degree of
monitoring is assumed given.
14ward (1958), Vanek (1970), and others find that the income
sharing property also makes a LMF choose a smaller size than a
conventional firm when profits are positive.
15 rn this model only effort is included in the production function
so there is no difference between size and scale. If the production
function includes several inputs, the same conclusion can be extended to
scale in a straight-forward fashion.
16 For an excellent overview of the effects of other factors, see
Bonin and Futterman, 1986.
l7Johnson and Brooks (1983) also identify bureaucratic interference
in farm decision making, poor quality inputs, lack of a smoothly
functioning supply system of non-farm inputs, distorted price incentives,
and lack of efficient rural labor markets as reasons for the low factor
productivity in Soviet agriculture.
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18 The average number of worker per farm in the Soviet Union was
about 515 for collective farms and about 550 for state farms (Johnson and
Brooks, 1983, p.4). In the U.S., it was 1.6 in 1979 (U.S. Department of
Agriculture, 1980, p. 431). As pointed out by Bradley and Clark (1972),
the emergence of American corporate farms does not invalidate this
conclusion. American corporate farms are large in terms of total assets
and scale, but they typically employ only small numbers of permanent
workers. They are also most successful in production that is not
spatially dispersed and in using capital-intensive techniques in which
the problems of monitoring are minimal.

